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Abstract
Revenue sharing can be used to discourage low tax regions from
competing for capital and ¯rms with high tax regions. However, with
heterogeneous regions, revenue sharing involves net transfers across
regions and creates a \moral-hazard" problem { that is, regions may
want to invest less in market fostering public good when the bene¯ts
are shared across nations. This paper analyzes these costs and bene¯ts
of revenue sharing. When asymmetric regions compete in capital in-
come taxes only, we show that revenue sharing can be desirable for the
high tax region if it is pushed far enough (i.e., J-curve e®ect), while tax
harmonization is always harmful for the low tax region. When regions
also compete through public investments, we ¯nd that tax competi-
tion distorts (downwards) public investments. While revenue sharing
discourages public investments due to moral-hazard e®ect, it remains
bene¯cial in most cases. Moreover, there are new agglomeration forces
resulting from public investments, because the in°ow of capital raises
the incentive for public investments which in turn attract more capital.
This leads to the possibility of policy-induced agglomeration (which is
di®erent from the classical agglomeration forces in the New Economic
geography).
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Many federal countries have arranged equalization payments schemes
by which a central government transfers resources between jurisdictions.
These equalization payments are enshrined in the Canadian constitution
(see Smart 1996). Similar schemes are used in Australia, Denmark and
Switzerland (see Ahmad and Thomas, 1996) and in many developing coun-
tries (see Shah, 2004). They also underlie the European Union's Structural
Funds (the Regional Development Fund, the Social Fund, the Financial In-
strument for Fisheries Guidance and the European Agricultural Guidance
and Guarantees Fund) which amounts to one third of the EU budget be-
tween 2000 and 2006 (European Communities, 2004).1 Another example is
Germany, where in addition to the transfers from the Federal to State gov-
ernments, there exists a scheme of transfers across states. Payments out of
states with more than average revenue per capita into those with less than
average amount to 25 million Euros in 1996 (Spahn and FÄ ottinger, 1997). In
the US, the state tax sharing is one of two forms of state intergovernmental
aid to local governments. The other form consists of appropriated categori-
cal grant-in-aid. Data show that state intergovernmental aid by each state
to its local governments (combined city and county) is the largest element
of state expenditures. In 2000 the share of state intergovernmental expen-
ditures in state general revenue was on average 33.2% in the US, and the
average for the Southern states was 29.9%. This intergovernmental expendi-
tures includes grant-in-aid, shared taxes and reimbursement for the cost of
certain programmes carried out by localities. From 1985 to 2000, payments
to local governments have remained at an almost constant percentage of
total general expenditures (32% to 35 %).2
The alleged purpose of these scheme is an attempt to equalize the citizens
access to public services across jurisdictions, i.e., correct ¯scal imbalances.
Another reason, outlined in a seminal contribution by Boadway and Flat-
ters (1982),3 is that ¯scal equalization schemes can generate e±ciency gains
by internalizing the ¯scal externality (through federal transfers equal to the
This research was partially supported by the ARC project on Heterogeneity in economics.
We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Kristian Behrens, Georges Casamatta,
Giordano Mion, Pierre Picard, Jacques Thisse and participants of the CORE-IDEI con-
ference on Public Economics (Toulouse, May 2005), the Summer School in the Analysis
of Heterogeneity in Social Organizations (CORE, June 2005) and the Workshop on Fiscal
Federalism (Barcelona, June 2005)
This text presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of
Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's O±ce, Science Policy Pro-
gramming. The scienti¯c responsibility is assumed by the authors.
1Note that this ¯gure does not include the Common Agricultural Policy.
2Fiscal year 2000 data is from the US Bureau of the Census,
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.
3See also Stiglitz (1983) and Dahlby and Wilson (1994).
1di®erence between a jurisdiction's actual source-based revenue and the av-
erage level of the federation). While Boadway and Flatters (1982) assumed
the lack of jurisdictions' incentives to alter tax rates in response to equaliza-
tion policies, it has been later shown that the e±ciency gains are sustained
even if this assumption is relaxed.4 Then the federal planner may design
intergovernmental transfers to implement the e±cient tax rates at the local
level.5 However, unless there exist lump sum transfers at the federal level,
there is no guarantee that all jurisdictions bene¯t from such transfers and
would implement it on a voluntary basis. To address the issue of voluntary
inter-regional transfers, Hindriks and Myles (2003) have shown that sym-
metric jurisdictions, while competing for a mobile tax base, can voluntarily
agree to share revenue as a strategic device to limit harmful tax competition.
When regions are heterogenous, notably in terms of ¯scal revenue, it is no
longer clear that they could all bene¯t from revenue sharing arrangements.
Those with low ¯scal revenue would bene¯t while those with high ¯scal rev-
enue would bear disproportionate shares of the ¯scal burden. This is the
¯rst issue we will address in this paper.
The second issue is related to the form of competition between regions.
How to attract capital and investments in one jurisdiction? Lighter tax
burdens, coupled with public expenditures on infrastructure or other public
services that raise ¯scal revenue ability, provide a set of policy tools that
can in°uence investment and capital °ows. With several policy instruments
it is less clear that competitive pressures will lead to a race to the bottom
between jurisdictions. For example, while state and local governments in
the US vary widely in their public services provision and taxation levels,
the competition among these governments has not led to \withering away"
taxation and public expenditures. As for Europe, Baldwin and Krugman
(2004) have found that tax revenue in percent of GDP di®ers substantially
between the so-called \core" and \periphery" countries. Their explanation is
that ¯rms in the core countries are more likely to pay higher taxes in return
for better infrastructure and proximity to a larger market.6 Using ¯rm level
e®ective tax rates for large Belgian ¯rms, Vandenbussche et al. (2005) ¯nd
large regional disparities, where the \peripheral" region of Wallonia charges
a much lower e®ective tax rate than the \core" region of Flanders. Head and
Mayer (2004) study the choice of location of Japanese ¯rms across Europe
and conclude that taxes are far from being the main determinant: the market
size and agglomeration externalities play an important role.
4See, e.g., Bird and Slack (1990), Wildasin (1991), Smart (1998), Koethenbuerger
(2002), Bucovetsky and Smart (2004), Figuiµ eres et al. (2004).
5There is also some empirical literature on the relationship between intergovernmental
transfers and local tax e®ort: Buettner (2005), Dahlby and Warren (2003), Baretti et al.
(2003), Hepp and von Hagen (2001), among others. A more theoretical paper is Bordignon
et al. (2001) who show how intergovernmental transfers a®ect tax enforcement.
6See also Krogstrup (2003).
2In this paper we model tax and public investment competition as follows.
We consider an economy with a total stock of capital that is to be divided
between two localities. Each locality provides local public investments. As
the public investment increases, the productivity of capital is increased and
the locality will attract more capital. This assumption implies that ¯scal
revenue can be written as an increasing function of public investment. There
is also a cost to increasing public investments. It is assumed that localities
choose their public investments before setting taxes. This simple model
shows that °ows of capital between localities will induce ine±cient choices
of taxes and public investments. The reason for this is that the movement
of capital between localities reduces the tax base of the locality they leave
and increases the tax base they join. These non-market linkages lead to the
ine±ciency. An important feature of our model is the tax-public investment
interaction. In fact, localities that o®er a slightly more appealing set of
local public investments may appear more attractive even if they tax more
capital. If the two issues become entangled in this way then the equilibrium
outcome is less clear. Further di±culties with the hypothesis arise when the
localities are heterogeneous ex-ante in their capacity to attract capital, as
they will in general choose di®erent policies.
We argue that the ¯scal externality problem could be resolved together
with the issue of ¯scal equalization by using revenue sharing, while it can-
not with tax harmonization. The method of controlling externalities by
internalizing the ¯scal externality ensures that private and social costs of
taxation become the same. It seems a simple solution but it is not without
its di±culties when there are also public investment decisions to be consid-
ered. In fact, revenue sharing has two opposite e®ects in terms of e±ciency.
The positive e®ect is to mitigate the harmful tax competition that leads to
sub-optimally low tax rates. This positive e®ect is greater the greater the
mobility of the tax base. The negative e®ect is related to the moral hazard
problem: regions exert public investment e®orts that enhance tax revenue
which are discouraged by revenue sharing insofar as the bene¯ts (in terms of
larger tax revenue) are shared across regions. This negative e®ect is greater
the greater the elasticity of public investment to revenue sharing.7 Take the
extreme case of full revenue sharing. It will clearly eliminate any distortion
in tax choices because each locality will internalize the revenue loss it in°icts
on other by cutting tax to attract more capital. However this solution will
reduce signi¯cantly the incentives to invest in local public investments, since
all the gains would be shared equally with other localities, while the cost
will fall only the locality that raises its public investment. The problem is
compounded when localities raises di®erent amounts of tax revenues since
7Careaga and Weingast (2000) argue that when governments have reelection concerns,
revenue sharing due to the common pool e®ect reduces governments incentive to invest
in market fostering public goods, and favors transfers to special interest to gain political
support.
3then full revenue sharing involves a net transfer from the high revenue to
the low revenue localities.
We argue that revenue sharing is desirable under ¯scal competition cir-
cumstances even if it discourages public investment and if regions are asym-
metric. The main challenge is to examine the balance of the two opposite
forces. Surprisingly enough, we ¯nd that when regions are symmetric, the
positive e®ect always dominates, whatever the mobility of tax base and
elasticity of public investment. The reason is that revenue sharing leads the
regions to act less agressively.
A further e®ect of revenue sharing is ¯scal equalization: tax sharing is
used to absorb ¯scal imbalances among regions. Therefore we introduce
regional heterogeneity in the model to see if the rich \core" region (with
larger tax base) can bene¯t from sharing its revenue with the poor \periph-
ery" region (with smaller tax base). We study ¯rst this issue by assuming
away the public investment disincentive from revenue sharing. We then ¯nd
that if the degree of heterogeneity is low, the ¯scal revenue of each region is
monotonically increasing with the rate of revenue sharing. However, under
high degree of heterogeneity the e®ect of revenue sharing for the core region
is ambiguous. A moderate revenue sharing would result in ¯scal revenue
loss while a more substantial revenue sharing would result in a gain. This is
the so-called J-curve e®ect of revenue sharing. It arises because, as revenue
sharing increases, the tax rates converge redistributing capital to the bene¯t
of the core region.
Adding public investments does not change the result in a fundamental
way. However, public investments will be distorted downwards to cope with
the ¯scal competition. Public investment will also open up the new possibil-
ity of capital agglomeration. If capital is su±ciently mobile, one region may
attract the entire stock of capital by taking advantage of increasing returns
in public infrastructure investment. This policy-induced agglomeration is
the result of regional policy choice.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the ba-
sic model without public investments and derives the equilibrium outcome.
Section 3 proceeds to the analysis of the e®ect of revenue sharing on the
di®erent regions. Section 4 extends the model to account for public invest-
ments. Section 5 addresses the issue of agglomeration. Section 6 concludes.
The proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.
2 The Framework
Suppose there are two regions, called \core" and \periphery". Both
regional governments levy a tax on the mobile tax base (capital). The gov-
ernment in each region has to share the same fraction ® 2 [0;1=2), i.e.,
ranging from none to full sharing, of its revenue with the other region. We
4assume that the regions correctly anticipate how their tax choices, tc and
tp, respectively, will a®ect the allocation of capital. Naturally, the core re-
gion has an initial advantage vis-a-vis the periphery in the sense that with
identical taxes the core attracts more capital than the periphery. The attrac-
tiveness of the core region is explicitly introduced through the heterogeneity
parameter ² that measures the relative advantage of the core over the pe-
riphery.8 It has been shown empirically that capital is not perfectly mobile
(Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). We capture this idea by using a Hotelling
(linear) location model. The core is located at 0 and the periphery at 1.
The repartition of capital is obtained by equating the (e®ective) net of tax
return adjusted for the mobility cost, ± > 0, so that the fraction of capital
in the core region, xc = xc(tc;tp) 2 [0;1] solves









We also de¯ne xp(tc;tp) = 1 ¡ xc. Note that if the taxes in both regions
are identical, the fraction of capital attracted is entirely determined by the
degree of heterogeneity, i.e., xc(t;t) = (1 + ²)=2 .9
Given the revenue share ® 2 [0;1), both regions anticipate the alloca-
tion of capital and independently choose their tax rates so as to maximize
revenue:10
Rc(tc;tp) = (1 ¡ ®)tcxc + ®tp(1 ¡ xc)
Rp(tc;tp) = (1 ¡ ®)tp(1 ¡ xc) + ®tcxc:
It is easy to verify that the revenue functions are concave, thus, yielding the
8In New Economic Geography models, the core emerges endogenously as the region
where the economic activity agglomerates. Here, we de¯ne the core as the region with a
locational advantage.
9It is worth pointing out that the asymmetry between regions makes capital more
attracted to one region but does not a®ect the perceived elasticity of the tax base in the
di®erent regions. In most asymmetric ¯scal competition models it is the asymmetry in the
perceived elasticity of the tax base which is the driving force in generating the asymmetric
equilibrium outcome (see Hau°er, 2001).
10The assumption of revenue maximizing government is a shortcut for describing a
situation where residents care su±ciently about the provision of public goods that are
¯nanced by tax revenues (see Kanbur and Keen, 1993). What is the appropriate objective
function for the principal is ultimately an empirical question. However, it can be argued
that if the government maximizes a social welfare function with redistributive objective
in mind, then, under revenue constraints, in some cases the optimal policy must be net
revenue maximizing. This is true if the welfare gains from higher net revenue are su±cient
to o®set the losses in welfare due to a net revenue maximizing policy (see Chander and
Wilde, 1998). Finally, the focus of our analysis is inter-regional, an not intra-regional,
heterogeneity.



























where 0 · ® < 1
2. Note that taxes are strategic complements, and the e®ect
of revenue sharing is to reinforce this strategic complementarity. Figure 1
depicts the tax response functions. It is immediate to observe that with
complete revenue sharing ® = 1
2 the tax competition is fully internalized.
















Thus, the core region taxes more in equilibrium (see Baldwin and Krugman,














For 0 · ® < 1
2 it is easily seen that xc
¤ · 1 for all ² · 2, which we assume
hereafter. It is worth noting that ¯scal competition induces a net loss of
capital (relative to ¯scal harmonization) for the core region which is taxing
more in equilibrium. We have the following result.
6Proposition 2.1 Revenue sharing increases the equilibrium tax in either




Proposition 2.1, together with (1), immediately implies that the share of
capital captured by the core region increases in ®. Indeed, the core region
taxes in excess of the periphery and revenue sharing reduces the tax gap
redirecting some capital to the core region. Thus, the \pre-sharing" ¯scal
revenue of the core region, ¼c
¤ = tc
¤xc
¤ increases with revenue sharing. As we
shall see this e®ect can make revenue sharing bene¯cial to the core region.
We now proceed to see if both regions can bene¯t from revenue sharing.
We have the following result.
Proposition 2.2 For any degree of mobility and any degree of heterogene-
ity between regions, the total ¯scal revenue increases with revenue sharing
whereas the ¯scal revenue gap shrinks. Moreover, the ¯scal revenue of the
periphery increases.
Thus the periphery gains from revenue sharing because the reduction of
its tax base is more than o®set by the increase of its tax rate and the net
transfer from the core region. Obviously, the fact that total ¯scal revenue
increases with revenue sharing is not a su±cient condition for the core region
to gain. We show, however, that if regional heterogeneity, ², is small, then
the core region also bene¯ts from revenue sharing. However, if the degree
of heterogeneity is high, then modest revenue sharing is harmful to the
core region whereas su±cient revenue sharing can become bene¯cial. The
reason is the following. Fiscal revenue in the core region is the sum of its
pre-sharing revenue and the net transfer. The ¯rst term is increasing with
revenue sharing because it raises equilibrium taxes and redirect capital to
the core region. When ² is small, then the second term (the net transfer)
is small so that the core region also gains from revenue sharing. When ²
is large enough, then the net transfer is larger and the core region can
lose from revenue sharing. However as revenue sharing increases, the tax
rates converge redistributing capital to the bene¯t of the core region. We
summarize our result in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.3 There exists a threshold degree of heterogeneity, ² < 2
such that:
(i) if ² < ², the ¯scal revenue of the core region always increases with ®,
(ii) if ² ¸ ², there is a critical revenue share ®(²) < 1=2 such that the ¯scal
revenue of the core region is ¯rst decreasing for ® < ®(²) and then increasing
for ® ¸ ®(²). Moreover, the threshold ®(²) is increasing.
Figure 2 depicts the ¯scal revenue of the core region as a function of
the revenue share for ² = 2.11. The graph is a J-curve implying that the
11The value of ± is irrelevant since all equilibrium taxes are scaled-up by ± and is set
equal to 1
7Figure 2: J-curve









¯scal revenue of the core region rises when revenue sharing is pushed far
enough. This result suggests that large revenue sharing could be accepted
by rich regions whenever small ones would be resisted. This argument can
support the rejection of the gradual revenue share by the Western European
countries during the negotiations for their entry to the European Union.
Indeed, as our argument shows, a low degree of revenue sharing could be
harmful to the core countries.
To summarize, revenue sharing raises the total ¯scal revenue and re-
duces the ¯scal gap between regions, implying that the periphery bene¯ts
from revenue sharing. This is not so surprising. Perhaps more surprising is
the result that the core region can also bene¯t from revenue sharing, even
if its ¯scal capacity is much larger, provided that revenue sharing is pushed
far enough. In this case the e±ciency gain (i.e., relaxing harmful tax com-
petition) from revenue sharing outweighs the cost of transferring resources
to the periphery.
The alternative solution to tax competition is the tax harmonization.
Could it be bene¯cial to each region? Consider that tax harmonization
takes the following form:
t(¸) = ¸tc
¤ + (1 ¡ ¸)tp
¤
with 0 · ¸ · 1. So the uniform tax rate is a convex combination of the
equilibrium tax rates. With high ¸ there is harmonization on the highest
equilibrium tax and with low ¸ there is harmonization on the smallest tax.
We have the following result
Proposition 2.4 Suppose there is no revenue sharing and there is tax har-
monization in the form of convex combination between the core and periphery
equilibrium taxes. Then there exists no harmonized tax rate that could bene¯t
the periphery.
The reason is that the periphery loses capital as a result of tax harmo-
nization. With harmonization to the bottom, ¸ ! 0, the periphery gets less
8capital but taxes the same as in equilibrium, which lowers its ¯scal revenue.
Contrarily, with harmonization to the top ¸ ! 1 , the core region is better
o® because it will get more capital, while taxing the same as in equilibrium.
3 Public Investments
We now extend the model to account for public investments. Each
regional government levies a tax on a mobile tax base (capital) and invests in
public inputs which can raise the productivity of capital. Public investment
in infrastructures is a long-term decision variable: we capture this feature
by modelling a two-stage game, where in the ¯rst stage regions choose non-
cooperatively public investment levels (gc;gp). The cost of public investment
in region i, I(gi), and the productivity of public investment , f(gi), are
twice continuously di®erentiable and increasing. We naturally assume that
the cost function is convex while the productivity function is concave. The
analysis in the previous section is a special case where f(gi) = 1 for all gi,
with i = c;p.
Both regions anticipate correctly how their public investment decisions
will a®ect the tax choices (tc;tp).
Both regions reckon that the repartition of capital varies with public
investment and taxes. Let xc(t;g) 2 [0;1] be the fraction of mobile factor
invested in the core region, with t = (tc;tp) and g = (gc;gp). Again, from
the Hotelling (linear) location model, we obtain the capital allocation by
equating the net returns, adjusted for locational attachment. That is, xc =
xc(t;g) solves






(1 ¡ tc)f(gc) ¡ (1 ¡ tp)f(gp)
2±
; (2)
where, as before, the parameter ² > 0 captures the initial regional hetero-
geneity between core and periphery.
Given the revenue sharing arrangement, regions maximize tax revenue
net of the cost of public investments. These expressions are given by:
Rc(t;g) = (1 ¡ ®)xctcf(gc) + ®(1 ¡ xc)tpf(gp) ¡ I(gc); (3)
Rp(t;g) = (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ xc)tpf(gp) + ®xctcf(gc) ¡ I(gp): (4)
In this setting, revenue sharing has three di®erent e®ects. First, it helps
to internalize the ¯scal externality, thus reducing the negative consequences
of ¯scal competition. Second, it discourages public investment and, hence,
decreases the overall ¯scal revenue. Third, it equalizes ¯scal revenues.
9We ¯rst examine the benchmark e±cient policy (ti
o;gi
o)i=c;p, where a
benevolent planner chooses both public investments and taxes in the two
regions in order to maximize their joint ¯scal revenue. That is,
(ti
o;gi




xitif(gi) ¡ I(gi): (5)
Given that the tax base is inelastic within the federation, it is optimal to
set maximal taxes (equal to 1). Thus, the share of capital in the core and
periphery is xc = (1 + ²)=2 and xp = (1 ¡ ²)=2, respectively. Therefore,
investment in each region equates marginal cost to marginal bene¯t. Let us
denote by Á(gi) the ratio of the marginal cost to the marginal bene¯t of the





We get the following result:














Note that since the function Á is increasing, the e±cient solution yields




Using the e±cient policy as a benchmark, we now proceed to determine
the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium in taxes and public investment lev-
els when decisions are devolved to regions. Since public investment creates
a negative externality in the other region that is not properly taken into ac-
count by the region, one could think that the equilibrium public investment
level is too high, leading to overprovision. As we now show, this is not true.
In the second stage of the tax subgame, regions take public investments
g = (gc;gp) as given and independently choose taxes. The capital allocation
















Comparing (2) and (6), it follows that with no revenue sharing (® = 0), the
equilibrium tax choices change the perceived elasticity of the tax base to
public investments: @e x=@gc 6= @xc=@gc. Also the perceived elasticity of the
tax base to public inputs increases with revenue sharing.
In the ¯rst stage of the game, regions choose public investments correctly
anticipating the tax equilibrium. The equilibrium investments, taxes and
10capital allocation will be denoted by
¡
^ gi;^ ti; ^ xi¢
with i = c;p. From the
¯rst-order conditions for investment choices (see Appendix B), we obtain:








we can state the following result:
Proposition 3.2 In equilibrium each region under-invests and revenue shar-
ing lowers public investments.
It is noteworthy that there is under-investment even without revenue
sharing. The reason is that investment exacerbates the competition in the
tax subgame. Indeed, public investments raise the productivity of each unit
of capital and lead each region to compete more ¯ercely in taxes to main-
tain its capital. Thus higher investments induce lower equilibrium taxes.12
Because of the moral-hazard e®ect, revenue sharing discourages investments.
What about relative equilibrium investments across regions? The fol-
lowing proposition states how the equilibrium public investment levels are
related to the distribution of capital and ¯scal revenues.
Proposition 3.3 In equilibrium the region with higher public investment
also attracts more capital and produces more ¯scal revenue.
The fact that when the core region invests more it has more capital is
a consequence of optimal tax choices, as clear from (6). For the periphery
region, however, to attract more capital it has to invest su±ciently more to
o®set its initial lack of attractiveness. What the proposition says is that, it
will only be worth to invest more for the periphery if this extra investment
secures more capital for this region. It is somewhat surprising that in equi-
librium the periphery may end up with more capital and ¯scal revenue than
the core region.
12More speci¯cally, increasing investment leads the other region to set lower tax rate.








< 0; for i;j = p;c; i 6= j:
114 Impact of revenue sharing
By Proposition 3.2 revenue sharing discourages public investments in
equilibrium. However revenue sharing has also the positive e®ect of inter-
nalizing the ¯scal externality. Hence, it is not clear what is the net e®ect of
revenue sharing for either region.
We ¯rst point out that with identical regions (i.e. ² = 0) each region
bene¯ts from revenue sharing. The reason is that, in the symmetric equilib-
rium, revenue sharing does not involve redistribution between regions but
it leads each region to compete less aggressively by cutting investment and
rasing taxes.
Proposition 4.1 With symmetry, each region bene¯ts from revenue shar-
ing regardless of the degree of mobility and the elasticity of public investment
to revenue sharing.
Since public investment creates a negative externality in the other region
that is not properly taken into account by the region, one could think that
the equilibrium public investment level is too high and thus that revenue
sharing is desirable because it brings down the public investment level closer
to the optimal level. As we have already shown, this is not true. This ¯nding
is illustrative of those in the second-best analysis which say that reducing
the number of distortions is not necessarily a good thing. Indeed revenue
sharing raises ¯scal revenue even though it distorts public investment choice.
The reason is that revenue sharing also induces improved tax choices. Two
small distortions are preferable to a large one.
This symmetric analysis illustrates clearly the e±ciency gains of revenue
sharing on tax and public investment levels. We now proceed to the analysis
of the asymmetric model. The objective is to see if the e±ciency gains of
revenue sharing can outweigh its cost for the rich region which then has to
transfer more to the poor region than it receives.
In order to get a clear insight of the various e®ects of revenue sharing in
the asymmetric game, consider that f(g) = g and I(g) = g2=2. The expres-
sions for equilibrium taxes and public investments are found in Appendix
C. We can prove that revenue sharing increases total ¯scal revenue. When
it comes to regional revenue (and ¯scal gap), we use numerical simulations
to illustrate the e®ect of revenue sharing. Figure 3a shows a few illustrative
cases when the core region invests more and attracts more capital. Fiscal
revenues and ¯scal gap are shown here, while taxes, investment levels and
equilibrium capital allocation are depicted in Appendix C.
We may draw two main lessons from these numerical simulations. Firstly,
it is still possible that both regions bene¯t from revenue sharing in this set-
ting. Secondly, the interaction of investments, taxes and revenue sharing
yields unexpected results. For instance, revenue sharing can exacerbate re-
gional inequalities and harm the poor region (see Figure 3a). Looking at
12Figure 3a: Fiscal revenue and revenue sharing
² = 0:01, ± = 0:23 ² = 0:3, ± = 0:31






























































equilibrium taxes and investment levels in Figure 3b (in Appendix C), we
may grasp the intuition for this result. As revenue sharing gets higher, the
periphery's tax rate becomes very high and its investment very low, as com-
pared to the core region. This causes massive out°ow of capital making the
periphery worse o®.
There exists also the possibility of an equilibrium in which the periphery
invests more, attracting more capital and having higher ¯scal revenues as a
consequence. This catch-up equilibrium is, however, unstable. When such
an equilibrium exists, there exist two equilibria with full agglomeration of
capital, as we show in the following section.
135 Policy-induced agglomeration
One interesting e®ect of public investment is to bring about new ag-
glomeration forces due to increasing returns in policy choices. Consider a
small perturbation from a symmetric allocation of capital; it will induce
the region with more capital to slightly invest more and the other region
to slightly invest less. This in turn will trigger further reallocation of cap-
ital towards the region investing more, increasing further its incentive to
invest in public good. A chain reaction is then in place which leads to the
progressive agglomeration of capital in a single region through increasing
public investments. Indeed, it is then endogenous regional policy choices
that cause agglomeration of economic activities in one of the regions. We
are dealing here with policy-induced agglomeration, di®erent in nature from
the agglomeration arising in the New Economic Geography (NEG) litera-
ture, where policy choices play no role. The spatial equilibrium stems from
equilibrium behavior of pro¯t maximizing ¯rms, which may pro¯tably locate
in one single region, from which they serve foreign markets, when transport
costs are su±ciently low. Note that these transportation costs are sometimes
taken as a proxy of infrastructure development (e.g. railways or highways
that decrease the cost of distance). This is not to be confounded with the
public investments in infrastructure we refer to in this paper, which increases
capital productivity, not its mobility.13
To get more insight on policy-induced agglomeration, we consider iden-
tical regions, with no revenue sharing and f(g) = g, I(g) = g2=2. Then the














where, to guarantee concavity of the revenue functions, ± ¸ ± = 1=9.
We can state that (i) public investments are strategic substitutes, and
(ii) the slope of the reaction functions is smaller than 1, if ± > 2±. Otherwise,
the interior equilibrium is unstable. Figure 4 illustrates the best replies in
both cases.
We have the following result.
Proposition 5.1 With ² = 0, for ± < ± · 2±, there is complete agglom-
eration of capital in either of the regions. For 2± < ± < 3± there exists a
symmetric equilibrium.
Introducing revenue sharing and regional asymmetry still brings about
the possibility ofpolicy-induced agglomeration. Again we have that, if the
13Indeed, the correct analogy is between transport costs in NEG and the mobility cost
of capital here for, as will be made clear, agglomeration arises for su±ciently low ±.
































mobility of capital is su±ciently high, the chain reaction with increasing
return in public investments leads to full agglomeration.
6 Conclusion
This paper tackles the issue of revenue sharing between heterogeneous
regions. In our framework, revenue sharing has three e®ects. Two are
e±ciency-related (the internalization of the ¯scal externality and the dis-
couraging of public investments) and the third one is redistributive. We
show that revenue sharing is desirable in a variety of settings, both for the
federation as a whole as for each region individually, even for the region
which is a net contributor to the system.
Our framework features the interaction between two policy chocies: market-
fostering public investments and capital taxation. These are very di®erent
in nature. On the one hand, public investments attract capital while taxes
drive it away; on the other hand, revenue sharing has a negative impact on
public investments and a positive one on taxes. Our main result is that,
even in the absence of revenue sharing, there is strategic under-investment
in infrastructure. This is because infrastructure raises the stake of tax com-
petition and leads the competing region to set a more competitive (lower)
tax. As regards revenue sharing, we show that its positive e®ect on taxes
outweighs the negative one on infrastructures, increasing total ¯scal revenue
. The reason why revenue sharing can be bene¯cial for all regions is that it
reduces the harmful tax competition among them both in terms of tax and
public investments. There are also increasing returns in public investments
15that can cause progressive agglomeration of capital in one region
The statement by the European Economic and Social Committee14 is
instrumental in reinforcing the policy relevance of the analysis undertaken
in this paper:
Western members have expressed fear that the new members may
represent too much of a burden for their own economies or the
European budget. (...) The public debate now focuses on wage
and tax competition, which would be used by new members to at-
tract production facilities and jobs. (...) Companies re-organize
(...) in order to bene¯t both from cost-e±cient locations and easy
access to expanding markets.
Our results suggest an argument against concerns of \older" EU mem-
bers' (core countries) related to the budget consequences of the recent EU
enlargement. Indeed, the core is shown to bene¯t from revenue sharing in a
variety of settings, in particular if revenue sharing is su±ciently large (the
so-called J-Curve e®ect of revenue sharing). On the other hand, the core
countries' should be concerned by the competition in public investments
from the periphery regions to attract capital. In a context of increasing
globalization, capital mobility is likely to increase and the outcome where
the periphery gets to increasingly more capital is a possibility.
Appendices
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Let a = 1
1¡® 2 [1;2] for ® 2 [0; 1
2]. The

















It is straightforward to verify that both expressions increase in a when




2+a, is decreasing in a. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Denote by Rc
¤(®) and R
p
¤(®) the revenue at
equilibrium for the core and the periphery, respectively. The substitution for
the equilibrium taxes and allocation of capital yields the following expression












































¤(®) is obtained by replacing ² by ¡², in the above expression. This yields






which is decreasing in a. Thus, revenue sharing has equalizing e®ect on



















(2 ¡ a)2 +
(2 ¡ a)
(2 + a)3±²2 > 0;
implying that the total revenue is increasing in the revenue share.¤
Proof of Proposition 2.3 We use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For any degree of mobility there exist a threshold degree of hetero-
















We consider solution of the equation H(²;a) = 0, e ²(a) on the rectangle
­ = [0;K] £ [1;2 ¡ ¢] where K is a su±ciently large number and ¢ > 0 is
su±ciently small.












2a(2 ¡ a)¡2 + 2a2(2 ¡ a)¡3¤
¡ 2
£






2a(2 ¡ a)(2 + a)¡3 ¡ a2(2 + a)¡3 ¡ 3a2(2 ¡ a)(2 + a)¡4¤
²2
= 2a(2 ¡ a)¡3 + 2a(2 + a)¡3² ¡ 4a(a ¡ 1)(2 + a)¡4²2:
The last expression is positive at ² = 0, and has a positive derivative at that
point. Moreover, at ² = 2, it is equal to
Ha(2;a) = 2a
£
(2 ¡ a)¡3 + 2(2 + a)¡3 ¡ 8(a ¡ 1)(2 + a)¡4¤
= 2a(2 ¡ a)¡3 + 12a(2 ¡ a)(2 + a)¡4 > 0
with Ha(2;a) ! 1 as a ! 2. Furthermore,
H²(e ²;a) = ¡2(1 + a)(2 + a)¡2 + a2(2 ¡ a)(2 + a)¡3²:
This expression is increasing in ² with H²(0;a) < 0. At ² = 2 it is equal to
H²(2;a) = ¡2(1 + a)(2 + a)¡2 + 2a2(2 ¡ a)(2 + a)¡3
= ¡2(2 + a)¡3 £
2 + 3a + (a ¡ 1)a2¤
< 0;
Thus, the derivative de ²=da is positive on the rectangle ­ = [0;2¡¢]£[1;2¡
¢]. Since at a = 1, e ² < 1 and lima!2e ²(a) = 1, we complete the proof of
the lemma. ¤
By using Lemma 1 and inverting the increasing function ²(®), we obtain
the increasing function ®(²) = ²¡1(®), which completes the proof of the
proposition.¤
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
Using equilibrium taxes, the harmonized tax is



































p(¸) for all ¸
which completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Given that the total stock of capital is
¯xed, maximizing total revenue requires tc = tp = 1.
Given optimal taxes, xc = 1+²















thermore, those levels satisfy Á(gc
o) + Á(g
p
o) = 1: ¤
Appendix B: Solving the public investments { tax game
² Part 1. First order conditions of the tax subgame
The ¯rst order conditions are
Rc

















= ® + (1 ¡ 2®)(1 ¡ xc):
By solving, we get
tc =
µ
















² Part 2. First order conditions of the investment subgame
















+ (1 ¡ e x)(1 ¡ e x ¡ ®)
¶
¡ I(gp):
19The Nash equilibrium in investment solves the ¯rst order conditions:
@Rc
@gc =
(2e x ¡ ®)f0(gc)
2 + a
¡ I0(gc) = 0; (11)
@Rp
@gp =
(2(1 ¡ e x) ¡ ®)f0(gp)
2 + a
¡ I0(gp) = 0:
which can be rewritten as:
2e x ¡ ®
2 + a
= Á(gc) (12)










±(2 + a)2 ¡ I00(gc); (13)






¢2 ¡ I00(gc): (14)
Then the su±cient conditions for quasi-concavity of the payo® function
(hence, existence of an equilibrium in investment levels) are: (i) the value in
(14) is non-positive; (ii) the value of (11) is nonnegative when gc = 0, and
(iii) the expression in (11) is continuous in gc.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: First let us rule out the possibility gc = gp.




which, by (12), implies that gc > gp, a contradiction.
Taking the ratio of the two expressions in (12), we have
2~ x ¡ ®





implying that Á(gc) > Á(gp) if and only if ~ x > 1=2. Finally, multiplying




xc(® + (1 ¡ 2®)xc)
1 ¡ xc(® + (1 ¡ 2®)(1 ¡ xc))
:
Since the value xc(® + (1 ¡ 2®)xc) is increasing in xc, we conclude that the
region with a higher ¯scal revenue also gets more capital. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.1 In the symmetric case where ² = 0, there
is a symmetric outcome in taxes and public investments. The ¯rst order
20conditions for taxes (7) and public investments (12), evaluated at t = tp;g =








Since Á is increasing, the last expression guarantees that g is a decreasing
function of a, and, as expected, revenue sharing reduces the equilibrium
public investment level in each region. Also, note that, due to ¯scal inter-











We now show that revenue sharing is desirable for both regions regardless
of the elasticity of public investment to revenue sharing (i.e for all Á > 0)
and the degree of mobility (i.e., for all ± > 0). At the symmetric Nash


















2(2 ¡ a)2 +
aI0(g)
Á0 > 0
for all values of mobility and elasticity ±;Á > 0:¤
Appendix C: Simulations in Section 4




±(3 ¡ 2®)2 ¡ 1
which is negative for ± > ±(®) = 1¡®
(3¡2®)2 = 1
a(2+a). Thus, the revenue
functions are globally concave if the value of ± is bounded away from ±(®).
Given revenue sharing, the interior equilibrium outcome is given by
^ tc = ±a
2 + a
2 ¡ a
±(2 + a)(2 + a + (2 ¡ a)²) ¡ 2a
±(2 + a)(2 + a + a2²) ¡ 2a
;
^ tp = ±a
2 + a
2 ¡ a
±(2 + a)(2 + a ¡ (2 ¡ a)²) ¡ 2a























(2 + a)2± ¡ 2a
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a ¡ (2 + a)2±
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a ¡ (2 + a)2±





(2 + a)2± ¡ a
(2 + a)2± ¡ 2a
²
Total ¯scal revenue is





a2(2 + a)2 ¡ a±2 a ¡ (2 + a)2±
((2 + a)2± ¡ 2a)
2²2:
and the gap is
Rc(a) ¡ Rp(a) =
2±
a(2 + a)
(2 + a)2± ¡ a
(2 + a)2± ¡ 2a
²: (16)
It is straightforward to show that Rc(a) + Rp(a) is increasing in a at the
stable interior equilibrium, i.e., when (2 + a)2± ¡ 2a > 0.
Figure 3b displays equilibrium taxes, investment levels and capital allo-
cation for the examples presented in section 4. The dashed (solid) curves
refer to the periphery (core).
22Figure 3b: Equilibrium taxes, investment levels and capital allocation
² = 0:01, ± = 0:23 ² = 0:3, ± = 0:31
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